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I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, academics have questioned the correctness of "noduty" rulings and expressed concerns about the abuse of such rulings.! This
1. See, e.g., Dilan A. Esper & Gregory C. Keating, Abusing "Duty", 79 S. CAL. L.
REv. 265, 268 (2006) ("California's proliferating 'no-duty' decisions are abusing the concept of duty, misshaping the law, and disrespecting the role of the jury."); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Shielding Duty: How Attending to Assumption of Risk,
Attractive Nuisance, and Other "Quaint" Doctrines Can Improve Decisionmaking in Negligence Cases, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 329, 334 (2006) ("[Duty] becomes the only hook that
judges need to set matter-of-law limits on negligence liability ... thereby functioning as a
blank check that judges can pull out whenever they want to carve out exemptions from liability."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILrrY FOR PHYSiCAL HARM § 7 cmt. a, at 91
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) ("No-duty rules are appropriate only when a court can
promulgate relatively clear, categorical, bright-line rules of law applicable to a general class
of cases.").
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casenote will consider the opinion of Marshall v. Burger King Corp., in
which the Supreme Court of Illinois overturned a "no-duty" ruling of the
trial court and determined that business owners have a duty to protect patrons from out-of-control vehicles crashing through their walls.2 Part 11 of
this casenote gives a brief history of how llinois courts approach the element of duty. Part 11I reports the facts and procedural history of the case.
Part IV is an analysis of the case including a report of the case and a critique of the majority's opinion. Part V addresses the practical impact of the
decision.
HI.

HISTORY

In cases where the appropriateness of recovery is unclear, the element
of duty can be used as a gatekeeping tool to limit the reach of negligence
law.3 On the other hand, courts can expand the circumstances covered by
negligence law by limiting the use of "no-duty" rulings.4 This flexibility is
due, at least in part, to the unclear meaning of duty as it applies to negligence law 5 and because the determination of whether a duty exists is a matter of law for the court to decide.6
The key to determining if a duty exists is deciding "whether [the] defendant and plaintiff stood in such a relationship to one another that the law
imposed upon defendant an obligation of reasonable conduct for the benefit
of plaintiff.",7 In Illinois, landowners owe a duty to entrants on their land to
exercise ordinary care, which consists of keeping the premises in a reasonably safe condition. 8 However, a landowner generally owes no duty to an2.
Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1059-60 (Il.
2006), reh'g
denied, 2006 Ill. LEXIS 1628 (Ill. 2006).
3. See, e.g., David Owen, Duty Rules, 54 VAND. L. REv. 767, 774-77 (2001)
('Through rigorously applied no-duty rules, courts closely controlled what categories of
defendants, plaintiffs, wrongdoing, and damages would be cognizable under the law of negligence.").
4.

See, e.g., id. at 775.

5. See 1 D. Dobbs, Torts § 229, at 582 (2001) ("[T]he existence of a duty is not a
discoverable fact of nature."); see also Esper and Keating, supra note 1, at 282-289 (describ-

ing six uses of the duty doctrine); Andrew Jay McClurg, The Tortious Marketing of Handguns: Strict Liability is Dead, Long Live Negligence, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 777, 796

(1995) (calling duty the "joker in the negligence deck").

6.
E.g., Mieher v. Brown, 301 N.E.2d 307, 308 (Ill. 1973).
7.
Ward v. K Mart Corp., 554 N.E.2d 223, 226 (11. 1990); accordHappel v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 766 N.E.2d 1118, 1123 (Ill.
2002); Mieher v. Brown, 301 N.E.2d 307, 308
(Il. 1973).
8.
See, e.g., Rowe v. State Bank of Lombard, 531 N.E.2d 1358, 1366 (I1. 1988)

("[I]f a landlord retains control of a portion of the premises leased to the tenant it has the
duty, as the party in control, to use ordinary care in maintaining that part of the premises in a
reasonably safe condition."); Corcoran v. Village of Libertyville, 383 N.E.2d 177, 181 (11.
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ticipate and guard against the negligent acts of others because a landowner
is not the insurer of an entrant's safety. 9 The reasoning behind this rule is
that to impose such a duty on landowners would "place an intolerable burden on society"' 0 and would be unfair to landowners.'
Nevertheless, there are certain "special relationships" through which
one lawfully obtains control over another.' 2 Through these special relationships, the party in control has a duty to protect the other party "against unreasonable risk of physical harm."' 3 The reasoning behind this rule is that
the submitting party has diminished his ability to protect himself by voluntarily consenting to the control of another.' 4 Illinois courts have recognized
four categories of these special relationships: common carrier-passenger,
5
innkeeper-guest, custodian-ward, and business operator-patron.
Compared to the other special relationships, courts have traditionally
been more tentative to impose a duty to protect on business operators, reasoning that patrons do not place themselves under sufficient control of the
businessperson to merit the imposition of such a duty. 16 Nonetheless, the
current trend has been to impose liability in these situations. 17 The rule for
1978) ("[D]efendants owed [invitee] a duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe
condition and to warn of dangerous, nonobvious conditions.").
9.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 cmt. f, at 225 (1965) ("Since the
possessor [of land] is not an insurer of the visitor's safety, he is ordinarily under no duty to
exercise any care until he knows or has reason to know that the acts of third person are occurring, or are about to occur."); Julie Davies, Undercutting Premises Liability: Reflections
On The Use And Abuse Of Causation Doctrine, 40 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 971, 976 (2003)
("California courts, like many jurisdictions, are hesitant to impose a legal obligation (the
duty element of a negligence claim) on landowners to control the criminal acts carried out on
the premises .... ); Dunn v. Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co., 537 N.E.2d 738, 745 (Ill. 1989) ("[The]
imposition of a general duty to anticipate and guard against the negligence of others would
place an intolerable burden on society.").
10.
Dunn v. Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co., 537 N.E.2d 738, 745 (Ill. 1989).
11.
See Donna Lee Welch, Comment, Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center: the
California Supreme Court Retreats from its "Totality of the Circumstances" Approach to
Premises Liability, 28 GA. L. REV. 1053, 1056 (1994).
12.
See Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 482-83
(D.C. Cir. 1970); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 314A, 118 (1965).
13.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 314A, 118 (1965); see also Hills v. Bridgeview Little League Assn., 745 N.E.2d 1166, 1187 (Ill. 2001).
14.
See Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 483
(D.C. Cir. 1970); Thomas J. Duff, Note, The Tort Liability of Mall Owners for the Criminal
Conduct of Third Parties, 36 DRAKE L. REv. 755, 756 (1987).
15.
E.g., Iseberg v. Gross, 852 N.E.2d 251, 255 (I11.App. Ct. 2006); Hills v.
Bridgeview Little League Assn., 745 N.E.2d 1166, 1187 (Ill. 2000).
16.
Hills, 745 N.E.2d at 1187 (citing Michael Bazyler, The Duty to Provide Adequate Protection: Landowner's Liability for Failure to Protect Patronsfrom Criminal Attacks, 21 ARIz. L. REv. 727, 736 (1979)).
17.
See Welch, supra note 11, at 1057; see also RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF TORTS:
LLAn.rIv FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 40 cmt. j, at 758 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005)
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these situations is set forth in § 344 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
which states that businesses open to the public are liable to patrons for
"physical harm caused by the accidental, negligent or intentional harmful
18
acts of third persons."
However, the existence of a business operator-patron special relationship does not per se impose a duty on the business to protect its patrons
from third-party acts.1 9 Commentf to § 344 states that a business person is
"ordinarily under no duty to exercise any care until he knows or has reason
to know that the acts of the third person are occurring, or are about to occur."2 0 In Illinois, it has been held that "a special relationship does not, by
itself, impose a duty upon the possessor of land" to protect lawful entrants
from the acts of third persons. 1 Instead, in order for a court to impose a
duty to protect patrons from the acts of third persons, the court must take
into account public policy considerations.22 Illinois courts express these
policy considerations in terms of four factors: (1) the reasonable foreseeability of the injury; (2) the likelihood of the injury; (3) the magnitude of
the burden of guarding against the injury; and (4) the consequences of placing that burden on the defendant. 23 The weight given to each factor depends on the circumstances of each case.24

("Businesses . . . who hold their land open to the public owe a duty of reasonable care to
persons lawfully on their land who become ill or endangered by risks created by third parties.").
18.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 344, at 223-24 (1965).
19.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 344, cmt. f, at 225-26 (1965).
20.
Id. at 225.
21.
Hills v. Bridgeview Little League Assn., 745 N.E.2d 1166, 1187 (Il1. 2000)
("Before a duty to protect will be imposed it must be shown that the [third party act] was
reasonably foreseeable... In addition, whether a duty exists will depend upon [other public
policy considerations]."). See also Cobb v. Martin IGA & Frozen Food Ctr., Inc., 785
N.E.2d 942, 948-49 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (holding that a grocery store did not have a duty to
protect its patrons from runaway shopping carts absent prior similar incidents).
22.
See Hills v. Bridgeview Little League Assn., 745 N.E.2d 1166, 1187 (I11.2000).
23.
See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1125 (Il.
2004); Hills, 745 N.E.2d at 1187; Lance v. Senior, 224 N.E.2d 231, 233 (Ill. 1967). There
are several cases in Illinois which state that a special relationship and reasonable foreseeability impose a duty, without mention of the other factors. See, e.g., Platson v. NSM, Am.,
Inc., 748 N.E.2d 1278, 1286 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) ("[A] person bearing a special relationship
to another has a duty to protect that person only from reasonably foreseeable attacks by third
parties."); Morgan v. 253 E. Del. Condo. Ass'n, 595 N.E.2d 36, 38 (11. App. Ct. 1992) ("Illinois does not impose a duty to protect others from criminal attacks by third persons; however, an exception is recognized where the criminal attack was reasonably foreseeable and
the parties had a special relationship"). These cases represent the minority view and do not
represent recent Illinois Supreme Court decisions. See Hills, 745 N.E.2d at 1187; City of
Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1125 (Ill. 2004).
24.
Widlowski v. Durkee Foods, 562 N.E.2d 967, 969 (Ill. 1990).
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III.

FACTS

The complaint from Marshall v. Burger King Corp. alleges that on
September 27, 2001, Pamela Fritz backed into a telephone pole while attempting to leave a Burger King restaurant in Rockford, Illinois.25 When
she pulled forward, the accelerator stuck, causing Ms. Fritz to lose control
of her car.26 The car hit the sidewalk, became airborne and penetrated the
half-wall and window of the Burger King restaurant.27 Detroy Marshall In
was eating at the Burger King restaurant at that time.28 He was struck by
Ms. Fritz's car and sustained fatal injuries.29 Mr. Marshall's estate brought
a negligence suit against Ms. Fritz, Burger King Corp. (hereinafter, "Burger
King"), and Davekiz, Inc. (hereinafter, "Davekiz"). 30 Davekiz was the
Burger King franchisee. 3'
The trial court granted defendants Burger King and Davekiz's motion
to dismiss for insufficiency in law under section 2-615 of the Illinois Code
of Civil Procedure, reasoning that the likelihood of this type of accident
was so small that to protect against it would require that every building be
fortified against poor drivers and would prevent visually attractive buildings from being built. 32 The appellate court reversed in a two-to-one opinion, claiming that it could not say as a matter of law that the precautions
suggested by plaintiff were beyond the general duty of reasonable care
owed by landholders.33 Thereafter, Burger King and Davekiz's petition for
leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court of Illinois.34

25.
Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 824 N.E.2d 661, 662 (I11.App. Ct. 2005).
26.
Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1051 (111. 2006).
27.
Id.
28.
Id.
29.
Id.
30.
Marshall, 824 N.E.2d at 661. Several insurers were also named in the complaint for spoliation of evidence. Marshall, 856 N.E.2d at 1051. These counts have been
settled and were not relevant to the court's opinion. Id.
31.
Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 824 N.E.2d 661, 662 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
32.
Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1052 (Ill. 2006). See also 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-615 (West 2002).
33.
Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 824 N.E.2d 661, 665 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). The
dissent criticized the majority for failing to follow precedent, claiming Simmons v. AldiBrenner Co., 515 N.E.2d 403 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987), and Stutz v. Kamm, 562 N.E.2d 399 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1990), were controlling. Marshall, 824 N.E.2d at 669 (McLaren, J., dissenting).

Both cases involved out of control cars crashing into buildings. Simmons, 515 N.E.2d at
405; Stutz, 562 N.E.2d at 401. The dissent also argued that Ms. Fritz's negligence broke the
causal link and thus the element of proximate cause was not satisfied. Marshall, 824 N.E.2d

at 669 (McLaren, J., dissenting).
34.

Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1053 (Ill. 2006).
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ANALYSIS OF MARSHALL V. BURGER KING CORP.

REPORT OF THE CASE

In a five-to-two decision, the Supreme Court of Illinois determined
that the plaintiff pled sufficient allegations to establish that defendants Burger King and Davekiz (hereinafter collectively, "defendants"), through their
roles as owners and operators, owed a duty of care to protect the decedent.35
In reaching its conclusion, the majority began its analysis by stating that the
key to determining whether a duty exists is "whether a plaintiff and a defendant stood in such a relationship to one another that the law imposed
upon the defendant an obligation of reasonable conduct for the benefit of
the plaintiff. 3 6 The court then recited the four policy considerations that
"inform this inquiry" - (1) the reasonable foreseeability of the injury, (2)
the likelihood of the injury, (3) the magnitude of the burden of guarding
against the37injury, and (4) the consequences of placing that burden on the
defendant.
The majority determined that the duty of care a business owes its invitees to protect them against the unreasonable risk of physical harm is applicable to this case,338 reasoning that the relationship between a business
invitor and invitee is a special relationship that "may give rise to an affirmative duty to aid or protect another against [an] unreasonable risk of
physical harm., 39 Additionally, the majority relied on dicta from Hills v.
Bridgeview Little League Ass'n. 4° In Hills, the Supreme Court of Illinois
held that a little league organization owed no duty to a coach who was attacked because there was no business invitor-invitee relationship between
the little league organization and the injured coach. 4' In its analysis, the
35.
Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1050 (Ill. 2006). The court
ruled that defendants forfeited their proximate cause arguments by not arguing them before
the trial court. Id. at 1054. Also, the court did not address allegations of negligent design or
negligent construction because in oral arguments both parties focused only on defendants'
potential liability as owners and operators. Id. at 1055.
36.
Id. at 1057. Prior to its analysis, the court distinguishes Ray v. Cock Robin, 310
N.E.2d 9 (I11.1974), and Marquardtv. Cernocky, 151 N.E.2d 109 (Ill. App. Ct. 1958), cases
relied upon by plaintiff, as being cases dealing with proximate cause and not duty. Id. at
1056.
37.
Marshall, 856 N.E.2d at 1057.
38.
39.

Marshall,856 N.E.2d at.1057-59.
Id. at 1058 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A, at 118 (1965)).

Also, the defendant argued that as landowners and business operators, defendants owed no
duty to protect decedent against unforeseeable acts of third persons under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344. Id. The court disregarded this argument, stating that § 344 is merely a
general statement of the rule from § 314A. Id.
40.
Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1058-59 (Ill. 2006).
41.
Hills v. Bridgeview Little League Assn., 745 N.E.2d 1166, 1191-92 (Ill. 2000).
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court in Hills noted that a businessperson who opens his land to the public
for business purposes "may reasonably expect that all might not behave,
and bears responsibility for injury that follows the absence of reasonable
precaution against the common expectation. 4 2 Applying this reasoning,
the majority in Marshall determined that businesses have an even greater
reason to anticipate negligent conduct because it can generally be assumed
that a person will not act criminally. 43 Justice McMorrow, writing the dissenting opinion, disagreed with this characterization of Hills, claiming that
Hills stands for the proposition that a special relationship alone is not
enough to establish a duty to protect."a
Thus, according to the majority in Marshall,the defendants owed the
decedent a duty of care that included protection from the negligent acts of
third persons by virtue of the business invitor-invitee relationship created
by the restaurant being open to the public.45 However, the court did not end
its analysis with this conclusion.46 The majority stated that the defendants
were seeking an exception to this duty by arguing that the traditional fourfactor public policy analysis weighs in their favor; however, the Marshall
court declined to make this exception. 47 The dissent criticized the majority's analytical framework, stating that it is a "substantial departure from
Hills" to the extent that it represents an overruling of the structure for analyzing affirmative duties to protect as set out in that case.4 8 The dissent
stated that Illinois precedent holds that "a court must examine the tradibefore it may impose an affirmative duty to protect on a
tional duty factors
49
,
defendant.
The defendants argued that because the public policy considerations
weigh in their favor, the court should rule that businesses have no duty to
protect invitees from out-of-control cars. 50 The dissent agreed with the
defendants and cautioned that imposing affirmative duties on landowners to
42.
Marshall,856 N.E.2d at 1059 (quoting Hills, 745 N.E.2d at 1188).
43.
Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B cmt. d, at 89 (1965)
("Normally the [defendant] has much less reason to anticipate intentional misconduct than
he has to anticipate negligence.").
44.
Marshall,856 N.E.2d at 1068 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). Hills, 745 N.E.2d at
1187 ("Before a duty to protect will be imposed it must also be shown that the [third party
act] was reasonably foreseeable. In addition, whether a duty exists will depend upon [the
other three public policy considerations].").
45.
Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1060 (Ill. 2006).
46.
Id.
47.
Id.
48.
Id. at 1068 (McMorrow, J., dissenting) ("The overruling of Hills and the creation of a new framework for analyzing the affirmative duty to protect are not the only troubling aspects of the majority opinion. Of equal concern is the majority's 'exemption' analysis and its application of the four traditional duty factors.").
49.
Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
50.
Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1060 (Ill. 2006).
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guard against third-party negligence would require landowners to police the
actions of others. 5 The dissent stated that previous cases decided by the
Illinois Supreme Court stand for the proposition that a narrow view should
be utilized when imposing such duties because guarding against third-party
negligence "would place an intolerable burden on society., 52 The majority,
however, found the imposition of a duty in this case more palatable than the
"no-duty" ruling argued for by the defendants.5 3 The majority declared that
"no-duty" rules can be drawn too broadly or narrowly and the decision
regarding a duty must be a "global policy" rather than a result of the specific
facts of the case, due to the fact that the ruling is a matter of law.54 Furthermore, the majority noted that "no-duty" rulings should only be used
when there should be no liability for defendants in all cases in which the
"no-duty" ruling would be applicable.
The majority next considered the traditional four-factor public policy
considerations to determine whether there should be an exception to the
general duty imposed by the business invitor-invitee relationship. 56 The
first public policy factor is the reasonable foreseeability of the injury.57
Defendants argued that the accident was not reasonably foreseeable because
it was "highly extraordinary" and "tragically bizarre., 58 The majority rejected this argument, claiming that this accident was foreseeable "given the
pervasiveness of automobiles, roadways, and parking lots. ' 59 Justice
McMorrow, in her dissent, claimed that a majority of courts have found
51.
Id. at 1072 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). See also, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: LABILITY FOR PHYsIcAL HARM § 37 cmt. e, at 714 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1,
April 6, 2005) (distinguishing between placing limits on conduct and requiring affirmative
duties).
52.
Marshall,856 N.E.2d at 1072-74 (I11.
2006) (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (quoting Ziemba v. Mierzwa, 566 N.E.2d 1365, 1369). See also Gouge v. Central Public Pub.
Service Co., 582 N.E.2d 108, 114 (Ill. 1991) (holding an affirmative duty to protect against
the negligence of third parties "would place an intolerable burden on society"); Ziemba v.
Mierzwa, 566 N.E.2d 1365, 1369 (Ill. 1991) (stating that since the condition on defendant's
land did not pose a danger to plaintiff absent the independent, negligent act of the third party
driver, the accident was not reasonably foreseeable).
53.
Marshall, 856 N.E.2d at 1060.
54.
Id. (quoting 1 D. Dobbs, Torts § 227, at 579 (2001)).
55.
Id. (quoting I D. Dobbs, Torts § 227, at 579 (2001)).
56.
Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1060-61 (I11.
2006).
57.
Id. at 1060.
58.
Id. at 1054.
59.
Marshall, 856 N.E.2d at 1060. The majority cites to Bigbee Telephone & Telegraph Co., 665 P.2d 947, 952 (Cal. 1983), and Blue v. Saint Clair Country Club, 131
N.E.2d 31 (11. 1955), for the proposition that it is the general nature of the injury that makes
it foreseeable, not the exact means by which it occurred. The dissent factually distinguishes
Bigbee and Blue because neither deals with parking lot accidents such as the one at issue
here. Id. at 1068-69 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
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similar incidents to be not reasonably foreseeable. 60 For example, in Albert
v. Hsu a driver backed a car over a six-inch curb, over a sidewalk and
through the wall of a restaurant, killing a child dining within. 6 1 In a suit
against the restaurant, the child's mother argued that the restaurant should
have erected barricades around the building.6 2 The Alabama Supreme
Court ruled that the restaurant owners owed no duty to the decedent, reasoning that although all auto accidents are somewhat foreseeable, some
accidents "fall within the category of the unusual or extraordinary, and are
therefore unforeseeable in contemplation of the law."6 3
With regard to the second public policy consideration, the defendants
argued that the likelihood of a similar incident is negligible and therefore
the likelihood of injury is low. 64 The majority dismissed this argument by
claiming that the likelihood of an injury occurring is high based on the
cases selected by the parties.6 5 The dissent agreed to some extent, claiming
that injuries are likely when vehicles negligently enter a business's premises, but whether or not an injury results depends on many factors.66
The majority considered the third factor, the magnitude of the burden
of guarding against the injury, and the fourth factor, the consequences of
placing the burden on the defendants, together.67 Defendants argued the
burden to them and similarly situated businesses would be considerable
because "protecting every storefront business and every store adjoining a
parking lot with the necessary barriers to stop any vehicle from being
driven into the building would be a gargantuan task' 68 and would lead to
69
less aesthetically pleasing buildings. Moreover, the defendants contended
Id. at 1070 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). The dissent cites sixteen cases from
60.
various jurisdictions for this proposition. Id.
Id. at 1069-70 (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (citing Albert v. Hsu, 602 So.2d 895
61.
(Ala. 1992)).
Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1070 (Il. 2006) (McMorrow,
62.
J., dissenting) (citing Albert, 602 So.2d 895).
Marshall, 856 N.E.2d at 1070 (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (citing Albert, 602
63.
So.2d at 898).
Marshall,856 N.E.2d at 1054.
64.
Marshall,856 N.E.2d at 1060-61 (referring to Ray v. Cock Robin, 310 N.E.2d 9
65.
(I1l. 1974), Simmons v. Aldi-Brenner Co., 515 N.E.2d 403 (I11.App. Ct. 1987, Stutz v.
Kamm, 562 N.E.2d 399 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), and Marquardt v. Orlowski, 151 N.E.2d 109
(Ill. App. Ct. 1958)).
66.
Marshall, 856 N.E.2d at 1075 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). These factors include the type of business, the type of vehicle, and the time of day. Additionally, the dissent
points out that the cases the majority was referring to were self-selected based on the facts of
this case. Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
67.
Id. at 1060-61. However, the dissent complained that the majority does not
even address the fourth factor. Id. at 1077 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1075 (I11. 2006) (McMorrow,
68.
J., dissenting) (citing Simmons v. Aldi Brenner Co., 515 N.E.2d 403 (I11.App. Ct. 1987)).
Id. at 1061.
69.
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that a business would never know what types of vehicles must be stopped,
70 The majority rejected all these arguments as
including trucks and SUVs.
"speculative at best,",7 1 even though the dissent cited several cases in which
courts have held that requiring barriers around buildings is unreasonable.72
The majority also claimed that to argue that this ruling will result in financial costs to businesses or lead to a change in the way buildings are constructed shows a misunderstanding of what a duty of care means. 73 The
majority stated that it was merely recognizing the existence of a broad duty
that business owners owe to invitees and that it was not intending to state
that there is a duty for businesses to install protective poles or prevent cars
from crashing into buildings.74 Instead, the majority stated that more fact
specific determinations should be made in the breach analysis, which was
beyond the scope of the opinion.75 The dissent disagreed, claiming that the
broad, categorical approach put forth by the majority makes all automobilerelated accidents foreseeable.76 Thus, according to Justice MeMorrow, all
businesses with parking lots or near roads are now insurers of their invitees'
safety.77
Defendants also argued that based on Commentf to § 314A of the Restatement Second of Torts and Cobb v. Martin IGA & Frozen Food Ctr.,
Inc. in order for a business to have an affirmative duty to protect its invitees
from the harmful acts of third parties, it must be on notice by means of prior
similar incidents.78 In Cobb, the plaintiff alleged that she was injured when
an unsupervised child ran into her with a shopping cart at the grocery
store.79 Plaintiff claimed that the grocery store breached its duty to exercise
Id. at 1075 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
70.
71.
Id. at 1061.
Marshall, 856 N.E.2d at 1075 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Simmons
72.
v. Aldi-Brenner Co., 515 N.E.2d 403,408 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (imposing a duty "would place
a burden on every store near a street or parking lot, of constructing barriers adequate to
prevent any car from being driven into the building"); Jefferson v. Qwik Korner Mkt., Inc.,
34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 171, 175 (Cal Ct. App. 1994) ("Imposing a duty on a convenience store to
protect a customer from every imaginable incident is an unreasonable burden: a motorcycle
can pass between metal posts and a large truck can break through a cement wall. Only an
impregnable barrier would suffice, in essence holding the store owner as the insurer of its
customers' safety. The law does not impose such a burden.").
73.
Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1061 (Ill. 2006).
74.
Id.
75.
Id.
76.
Marshall, 856 N.E.2d at 1074 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
Id.
77.
78.
Id. at 1061-62. See also Cobb v. Martin IGA & Frozen Food Ctr., Inc., 785
App. Ct. 2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 cmt. f, at 225-26
N.E.2d 942 (I11.
(1965) ("Since the possessor [of land] is not an insurer of the visitor's safety, he is ordinarily
under no duty to exercise any care until he knows or has reason to know that the acts of a
third person are occurring, or are about to occur.").
Cobb, 785 N.E.2d at 944.
79.
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reasonable care to protect its customers. 80 The court concluded that there
was no duty to protect because the attack was not reasonably foreseeable
since there were no prior similar incidents.8 1 The majority in Marshall
found these arguments unpersuasive and determined that the rule regarding
notice is not as strict as defendants contended.82 Furthermore, the majority
noted that the plaintiff argued sufficient facts in its complaint to show that
the defendants had reason to know that third-person negligence could injure
business patrons.8 3 Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants
had knowledge of the fact that the restaurant was in a high-traffic area, parts
of the building were susceptible to penetration by out-of-control vehicles,
and no protective pillars 85had been installed.84 Thus, this argument was also
rejected by the majority.
The majority also distinguished Simmons v. Aldi-Brenner Co., a case
in which a driver injured shoppers when he blacked-out and crashed into a
grocery store. 86 The majority stated that the Simmons court misapplied
negligence terminology when it held that "a duty did not legally exist" between the grocery store and the plaintiffs.87 Even so, the majority argued
that the case was reconcilable with Marshall because Simmons was related
to a post-trial motion that included breach and proximate cause. 88 The majority also found numerous out-of-state cases unpersuasive because they did
not deal with the sufficiency of a complaint and they provided for no-duty
exemptions, which the majority dislikes. 89
Also, this case overruled Stutz v. Kamm to the extent it is inconsistent
with the majority's opinion in Marshall.90 In Stutz, a car crashed into to a
driver's license facility, killing one woman and injuring another. 91 The
appellate court granted defendant facility owner's motion to dismiss, reasoning that the defendant owed the plaintiffs no duty because the event was
80.
Id. at 944.
81.
Id. at 948.
82.
Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1062 (I11.2006).
83.
Id.
84.
Id.
85.
Id.
86.
Id. at 1063. See also Simmons v. Aldi-Brenner Co., 515 N.E.2d 403 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1987).
87.
Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1063 (Il. 2006) (quoting
Simmons, 515 N.E.2d at 407).
88.
Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1063-64 (Ill. 2006).
89. Id. at 1065. The dissent levies the same complaint against the cases relied upon
by majority, stating that Bigbee v. Pacific Telephone & Telephone Co., 665 P.2d 947 (Cal.
1983), deals with summary judgment and Blue v. Saint Clair Country Club, 131 N.E.2d 31
(Ill. 1956), deals with the correctness of a jury verdict. Id. at 1071.
90.
Marshall, 856 N.E.2d at 1065. See also Stutz v. Kamm, 562 N.E.2d 399 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1990).
91.
Marshall, 856 N.E.2d at 1064.
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not foreseeable and
it would be an unreasonable burden on the defendant to
92
prevent against it.
B.

CRITIQUE OF THE MAJORITY'S OPINION

The majority's opinion in Marshall has far reaching implications for
businesses in Illinois. In this section, it will be argued that the majority's
opinion creates a nearly per se duty to protect patrons from third-party negligent acts. The court's reasoning for the imposition of an affirmative duty
to protect in this case, as well as its reliance on a categorical approach to
duty, creates a strong presumption of the existence of a duty in nearly all
third-party negligence cases involving business invitees.93 Additionally, the
presumption will be difficult to overcome based on the majority's application of the traditional public policy considerations in its "exemption analysis." 94 By creating what amounts to a nearly per se duty for businesses to
protect patrons from third-party negligent acts, the majority has extended
premises liability beyond its traditional limits and essentially made businesses the insurers of their patrons' safety.9 5
1.

Presumptionof an Affirmative Duty to ProtectBusiness Invitees

The majority's duty analysis in Marshall creates a presumption that
businesses owe a duty to protect their invitees against third-party negligent
acts under all circumstances. The majority concluded that a duty to protect
patrons from third-party negligent acts existed in Marshall based on § 314A
of the Restatement Second of Torts,9 6 dicta from Hills,97 and an argument
that negligent acts are more foreseeable than intentional criminal acts. 98 The

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 1064-65.
See discussion infra Parts IV.B.1, IV.B.2.
See discussion infra Parts IV.B.3, IV.B.4.
See discussion infra Parts IV.B.5, IV.B.6.
Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1058 (Ill. 2006) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A, at 118 (1965)) ("A common carrier is under a
duty to its passengers to take reasonable action.., to protect them against unreasonable risk
of physical harm ... A possessor of land who holds it open to the public is under a similar
duty to members of the public who enter in response to his invitation.").
Marshall,856 N.E.2d at 1059 (quoting Hills v. Bridgeview Little League Assn.,
97.
745 N.E.2d 1166, 1188 (Ill. 2000)) ("[P]laces to which the general public are invited might
indeed anticipate, either from common experience or known fact, that places of general
public resort are also places where what men can do, they might. One who invites all may
reasonably expect that all might not behave, and bears responsibility for injury that follows
the absence of reasonable precaution against that common expectation.").
98. Marshall,856 N.E.2d at 1059 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B
cmt. d, at 89 (1965)) ("[A]n actor typically has greater reason to anticipate negligence than
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majority noted that "the duty of care that arises from the business invitorinvitee relationship encompasses the type of risk - i.e., the negligent act of
a third person - that led to the decedent's injuries." 99 This reasoning can be
applied to any third-party negligence case involving injuries on a business's
property. °° Thus, a presumption of an affirmative duty to protect will be
established by any plaintiff that pleads there was a business invitor-invitee
relationship and the injury suffered was the result of a negligent act. 01 This
presumption is strengthened by the court's "categorical approach" to duty
in which all duty and "no-duty" rulings should0 3be universal 0 2 and the new
"exemption analysis" adopted by the majority.1
2.

CategoricalApproach to Duty and "No-Duty" Rulings

The presumption of a duty to protect patrons from third-party negli-°4
gent acts is strengthened by the majority's categorical approach to duty.1
The majority stated that because determinations of duty are "not decisions
about particular cases, they cover all cases in the category to which they are
addressed" and that "no-duty rules should be invoked only when all cases
they cover fall substantially within the policy that frees the defendant of
liability."'0 5
Practically, this means that if there is a fact pattern conceivable for a
given category of cases that would lead to liability for a business defendant,
to anticipate criminal misconduct, as it is generally reasonable for one to assume that a person will not violate the criminal law.").
99.
Marshall, 856 N.E.2d at 1059-60.
100.
This argument, however, will not apply to third party intentional acts because
"an actor typically has greater reason to anticipate negligence than to anticipate criminal
misconduct." Marshall, 856 N.E.2d at 1059 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §

302B cmt. d, at 89 (1965)). See also RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 302B cmt. d, at 89

(1965). Furthermore, the need for notice in such cases is well established in Illinois law.
See, e.g, Sameer v. Butt, 796 N.E.2d 1063, 1071 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (holding that "the stabbing was not reasonably foreseeable" because there were no similar incidents within the
preceding five years); Kolodziejzak v. Melvin Simon & Assocs., 685 N.E.2d 985, 990 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1997) ("We do not believe that any of the prior crimes would have put Simon Management on notice of the likelihood that a gang member would enter Yards Plaza's premises
with a gun and shoot an innocent person."); Lucht v. Stage 2, Inc., 606 N.E.2d 750 (I11.
App.
Ct. 1992) (holding that an attack by an assailant was reasonably foreseeable based on the
knowledge of a dance club's employees).
101.
This presumption may be overcome by the exception analysis, but it is unlikely.
See discussion infra Parts IV.B.3, IV.B.4.
102.
See Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1060 (111. 2006); See
discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
103.
Marshall, 856 N.E.2d at 1060-61; Marshall, 856 N.E.2d at 1067-68 (McMorrow, J., dissenting); See discussion infra Parts IV.B.3, IV.B.4.
104.
Marshall, 856 N.E.2d at 1060.
105.
Id. (quoting 1 D. Dobbs, Torts § 227, at 579 (2001)).
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then a ruling that there is an affirmative duty to protect is required in all
cases in that category. Thus, since Marshallfalls into the category of cases
involving business invitees injured by out-of-control vehicles' 6 and there
are instances in which liability will attach to a business when their patrons
are injured by out-of-control vehicles,'0 7 the categorical approach points to
a rejection of the argument for a "no-duty" ruling in the case.10 8 However,
a ruling of "no duty" would be appropriate for all cases in which a business
invitee is injured from a slip and fall resulting from a natural accumulation
of ice or snow.' 9 This is because in Illinois the natural accumulation rule is
an exception that has been carved out of the general duty of reasonable care
business invitors owe to their invitees.l10
This categorical approach to duty is supported by academics and has
It forces judges to
several benefits over case-specific determinations.'
which should
"no-duty"
determinations,
articulate their reasoning behind
2
Consequently, the categorical apmake negligence law more coherent.'
proach to duty will more clearly define the boundaries between tort law,
contract law, property law and conduct so remote that it does not need to be
regulated.' 3 Additionally, it will remove duty as a "live issue" in most
cases and provide a more defined line between the zones of judges and ju-

106.
Marshall, 856 N.E.2d at 1061 ("Recognizing that the duty of reasonable care
that businesses owe to their invitees applies to cases where invitees are injured by out-ofcontrol automobiles is not the same as concluding the duty has been breached because a
business failed to take a certain level of precaution.").
107.
See, e.g., Ray v. Cock Robin, Inc. 310 N.E.2d 9 (Ill. 1974).
108.
Marshall, 856 N.E.2d at 1060 ("Here, none of the considerations defendants
rely on compel us to hold that, as a matter of law, landholders who open their land to the
public for business purposes have no duty to protect invitees against out-of-control drivers.
We see no merit in such an exemption.").
109.
See, e.g., Kellermann v. Car City Chevrolet-Nissan, 713 N.E.2d 1285 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1999). See also Petition for Rehearing Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 367, at 4-6,
Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048 (I11.2006) (No. 100372) (arguing that
businesses in Illinois do not have a duty to protect against the natural accumulation of snow
and ice which are more common than airborne cars).
See, e.g., Kellermann, 713 N.E.2d 1285.
110.
111.
See, e.g., Esper & Keating, supra note 1, at 326 ("[D]ecisions must be made
categorically, not on a case-by-case basis."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYSICAL HARM § 7 cmt. a, at 91 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) ("No-duty rules are
appropriate only when a court can promulgate relatively clear, categorical, bright-line rules
of law applicable to a general class of cases.").
Esper & Keating, supra note 1, at 326-27 ("The fundamental problem is that
112.
courts are distorting the role of duty in negligence law by proceeding as though the existence
of obligation in tort is always an open question.... [To remedy this] courts must go back to
making duty decisions in an appropriately categorical way.").
113.
See id. at 327.
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ries, ostensibly putting issues of fact-finding back in the hands of the ju-

rors. 114

Another consequence of the categorical approach to duty is that judges
15
must err on the side of finding that an affirmative duty to protect exists.
This is because if there is one factual situation in the category that compels
liability to be imposed on the defendant, then a judge should not issue a
"no-duty" ruling." 6 The implications of the categorical approach may be
better shown by an example. In Perri v. Furama Restaurant, a four-year
old scalded his infant cousin with hot water when he spun a lazy susan upon
which a pot of hot tea had been set. 17 Reversing summary judgment for
the defendant restaurant, the appellate court held that the restaurant owed
the injured person a duty of reasonable care. 1 8 Based on the categorical
approach adopted by the majority in Marshall,"9 there should never be a
ruling of "no-duty" in this category of cases because liability could have
been imposed in Perri.120 Thus, a business defendant will always have an
affirmative duty to protect its patrons from negligent third-party spills of
hot liquid, regardless of circumstances surrounding the accident. This is
true unless the "exemption analysis" can be used by the defendants to overcome the strong presumption that an affirmative duty to protect is created
by the business invitor-invitee relationship and supported by the categorical
approach to duty.121
3.

Existence of the Exemption Analysis

The majority and the dissent in Marshall agree that both the business
invitor-invitee special relationship and the traditional four-factor public
policy considerations are involved in the duty analysis. 122 The dissent argues that "a special relationship, by itself, is not enough to establish an affirmative duty to protect" and the other public policy factors must be con114.
See id. at 269 ("But when duty is a live issue in every case it is impossible to
draw a principled line between the provinces of judge and jury. Judges are inevitably drawn
into second-guessing jury decisions on issues of reasonable conduct and care.").
115.
See Shank v. Fields, 869 N.E.2d 261, 273-74 (I1. App. Ct. 2007) (Myerscough,
J., specially concurring) (noting that the no-duty ruling in that case may set a "dangerous and
undesirable precedent" based on the categorical approach to duty put forth in Marshall).
116.
Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1060 (I11. 2006) (quoting 1 D.
Dobbs, Torts § 227, at 579 (2001)).
117.
Perri v. Furama Rest., 781 N.E.2d 631, 633 (I11.App. Ct. 2002).
118.
Id. at 637-38.
119.
Marshall,856 N.E.2d at 1060.
120. Perri, 781 N.E.2d at 637-38.
121.
Marshall,856 N.E.2d at 1060.
122.
Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1060-61; id. at 1067-68 (I11.
2006) (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
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sidered. 123 The dissent's view reflects Illinois caselaw. 124 The majority,
however, departed from the traditional rhetoric by using language that indicated that there is a presumption that a duty to protect exists
2 unless it can be
overcome by the traditional public policy considerations. 1
After concluding that a duty existed based on the special relationship,
the majority stated that "[t]his conclusion, however, does not end our inquiry into the duty issue"'126 and that by arguing the traditional four public
policy factors, the defendants "have essentially asked us to create an exemption from the duty of care ... " referring to the duty of care the majority had just declared. 27 This language is much stronger than the typical
language used by Illinois courts regarding this analysis. 28 This more explicit demarcation between the special relationship and the traditional public policy considerations further supports the contention that the majority's
opinion in Marshall creates a strong presumption of an affirmative duty to
protect in third-party negligence cases involving a business invitor-invitee
relationship.

123.
Marshall,856 N.E.2d at 1068 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
124.
Hills v. Bridgeview Little League Ass'n., 745 N.E.2d 1166, 1187 (Ill. 2000); see
also Cobb v. Martin IGA & Frozen Food Ctr., Inc., 785 N.E.2d 942, 948-49 (Ill. App. Ct.
2003) (holding that a grocery store did not have a duty to protect its patrons from runaway
shopping carts absent prior similar incidents); Cobb, 785 N.E.2d at 948 ("The general duty
of reasonable care does not extend to all risks of harm encountered by invitees while on
defendant's premises."); Simmons v. Aldi-Brenner Co., 515 N.E.2d 403, 406 (Ill. App. Ct.
1987) ('The owner or occupier of land owes to persons present on the premises as business
invitees the duty of exercising ordinary and reasonable care to see that the premises are
reasonably safe for use by the business invitees. However, a storekeeper is not the insurer of
his customers' safety. Liability must be founded on fault.").
125.
Marshall,856 N.E.2d at 1059-60.
126. Id. at 1060.
127.
Id. See also id. at 1057-58 ("[Tlhe special relationship between a business
invitor and invitee does indeed give rise to a duty of reasonable care that is applicable to this
case, and the factors relied on by defendants do not support the creation of an exemption
from that duty.").
128.
See Hills, 745 N.E.2d at 1187 ("The existence of a special relationship does not,
by itself, impose a duty upon the possessor of land to protect lawful entrants from the criminal acts of third parties. Before a duty to protect will be imposed it must also be shown that
the criminal attack was reasonably foreseeable.... [In addition, whether a duty exists will
depend upon [the other three public policy considerations.]"). See also Cobb, 785 N.E.2d at
948 ("The general duty of reasonable care does not extend to all risks of harm encountered
by invitees while on defendant's premises."); Simmons, N.E.2d at 406 ("The owner or occupier of land owes to persons present on the premises as business invitees the duty of exercising ordinary and reasonable care to see that the premises are reasonably safe for use by the
business invitees. However, a storekeeper is not the insurer of his customers' safety. Liability must be founded on fault.").
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Application of the Exemption Analysis

The presumption of the existence of a duty to protect patrons from
third-party negligent acts can be overcome through the "exemption analysis. ' ' 1 9 The majority in Marshall determined that there was no exemption
to the duty that businesses owe to their invitees under the facts of that
case. 130 In reaching this conclusion, the majority made summary conclusions about the public policy factors in one paragraph of its opinion. 13' The
majority found that none of the public policy factors weighed in favor of
the defendants. 32 Based on the majority's liberal and deferential application of the traditional four public policy factors, it will be difficult for future
defendants to overcome the presumption of an affirmative duty to protect in
third-party negligence cases involving the business invitor-invitee special
relationship.
a. Exemption Analysis Factor1: The Reasonable Foreseeability
of the Injury
The first public policy factor in the exemption analysis used by the
majority in Marshall is the reasonable foreseeability of the injury. 133 The
Marshall court liberally applied this factor in determining that the injuries
sustained by the decedent were reasonably foreseeable. 134 The court may
have had practical reasons for its liberal application of this factor as discussed more fully below. However, based on the majority's reasoning, it
will be difficult for future business defendants to overcome the presumption
of an affirmative duty to protect in third-party negligence cases involving
the business invitor-invitee special relationship.
In many jurisdictions, including Illinois, the reasonable foreseeability
35
injury is an important factor in determining whether a duty exists.
an
of
129.
Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048 at 1060 (Ill. 2006) ("In referring to the four factors this court traditionally considers in its duty analysis, defendants have
essentially asked us to create an exemption from the duty of care that stems from the special
relationship between a business invitor and invitee.").
130.
Id.
131.
Id.
132.
Id.
133.
Id. at 1060-61.
134.
Id.
135.
W. Jonathan Cardi, Reconstructing Foreseeability,46 B.C. L. REv. 921, 921922 (2006) ("[F]oreseeability now threatens to swallow the duty calculus whole ....
);
Hutchings v. Bauer, 599 N.E.2d 934, 935 (Ill. 1992) ("[T]he foreseeability of an injury is an
important factor in determining whether a duty exists .... "); Ward v. K Mart Corp., 554
N.E.2d 223, 226 (I11. 1990) ("The 'reasonable foreseeability' of injury is one important
concern .... "); Theofanis v. Sarrafi, 791 N.E.2d 38, 48 (I11.App. Ct. 2003) ("The foresee-
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136
Foreseeability is defined as "the quality of being reasonably anticipated."'
In analyzing this factor, courts will consider whether the risk of harm to the
injured party was reasonable.1 37 Accordingly, a reasonably foreseeable
injury is one that is "likely enough to occur that a reasonably thoughtful
person would take it into account in guiding his practical conduct."' 138 It is
important to note that foreseeability, as it relates to duty, must be objectively reasonable and not merely possible.' 39 It has been held by several
Illinois courts, including the Illinois Supreme Court, that "[wihere injury
no duty is present
circumstances,
results from freakish, bizarre or fantastic 14
0
asserted."
be
can
claim
negligence
no
and
In Marshall, the majority reasoned that the injuries sustained by the
decedent were reasonably foreseeable "given the pervasiveness of automobiles, roadways, and parking lots, that business invitees will, from time to
time, be placed at risk by automobile-related accidents."' 141 This reasoning
is out of line with the reasoning of other courts that have considered similar
factual circumstances. 142 Instead of being reasonable foreseeable, the acci-

ability of harm--the ex ante risk--is an important factor for determining whether the defen").
dant had a duty to the plaintiff ....
BLACK'S LAW DICMONARY 676 (8th ed. 2004).
136.
1991).
137.
Gouge v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 582 N.E.2d 108, 112 (I11.
138.
Raffen v. Int'l Contractors, Inc., 811 N.E.2d 229, 233 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (quotApp. Ct. 1995)).
ing St. Paul Ins. Co. of Ill. v. Estate of Venute, 656 N.E.2d 113, 117 (I11.
139.
Hills v. Bridgeview Little League Ass'n, 745 N.E.2d 1166 (Ill. 2000); SullivanCoughlin v. Palos Country Club, Inc. 349 Ill.App.3d 553, 557 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); Bates v.
Richland Sales Corp., 803 N.E.2d 977 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). See also Raffen, 811 N.E.2d 229,
233 ("Foreseeability of harm, in connection with a duty, is not a magical concept that ignores common sense.").
1999). See also
Washington v. City of Chicago, 720 N.E.2d 1030, 1033 (I11.
140.
Bonner v. City of Chicago, 778 N.E.2d 285, 291 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (stating the same);
App. Ct. 2002) ("If events are highly
Zakoff v. Chic. Transit Auth., 782 N.E.2d 873, 879 (I11.
extraordinary, tragically bizarre, or unique, then occurrence is not reasonably foreseeable,
for purposes of determining whether duty is owed.").
Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1060 (Ill. 2006).
141.
The dissent cites fifteen cases from various jurisdictions for the proposition that
142.
this accident is unforeseeable as a matter of law. Id. at 1070 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
App. Ct. 1987); Stutz v. Kamm, 562
See Simmons v. Aldi-Brenner Co., 515 N.E.2d 403 (I11.
N.E.2d 399 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Sotomayor v. TAMA I, LLC, 617 S.E.2d 606, 610 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2005); Heard v. Intervest Corp., 856 So.2d 359, 362 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003); Jefferson
v. Qwik Korner Market, Inc., 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 171, 174-75 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Fawley v.
Martin's Supermarkets, Inc., 618 N.E.2d 10, 13 (Ind. Ct. App.1993); Albert v. Hsu, 602
So.2d 895, 897 (Ala. 1992); Carpenter v. Stop-N-Go Markets of Ga., Inc., 512 So.2d 708,
709 (Miss. 1987); Grandy v. Bavaro, 521 N.Y.S.2d 956, 957 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987);
Hendricks v. Todora, 722 S.W.2d 458, 460-62 (Tex. App. 1986); Krispy Kreme Doughnut
Co. v. Cornett, 312 So. 2d 771, 772-73 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Nicholson v. MGM Corp.,
555 P.2d 39, 41 (Alaska 1976); Eckerd-Walton, Inc. v. Adams, 190 S.E.2d 490, 492 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1972); Mack v. McGrath, 150 N.W.2d 681, 686 (Minn. 1967); Schatz v. 7-Eleven,
Inc., 128 So. 2d 901, 904 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Watkins v. Davis, 308 S.W.2d 906, 909
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dent in Marshall seems to be the result of "freakish" or "bizarre" circumstances. 143 Indeed, this holding has some commentators concerned. 44
Even though everything is foreseeable in hindsight, 45 for the court to impose a duty on the defendant, the foreseeability of the injury to the plaintiff
must be objectively reasonable.'46 The accident in Marshall does not appear to meet this threshold because it seems unreasonable to expect a business to account for airborne cars crashing through the walls of its restaurant. 147 This is especially true given the fact that the defendants 48
were not on
notice of the potential danger by way of prior similar incidents.'
The majority in Marshall stated that the plaintiff plead sufficient facts
in its complaint to show that the defendants had reason to know that thirdperson negligence could injure business patrons because the plaintiff
claimed that the defendants had knowledge of the fact that the restaurant
was in a high-traffic area, parts of the building were susceptible to penetration by out-of-control vehicles, and no protective pillars had been installed. 149 It is likely that the majority's holding that this injury was reasonably foreseeable was due to the fact that this case was being decided at
the pleadings stage. 50 The defendants in Marshall attacked the complaint
(Tex. Civ. App. 1957). See also Achtermann v. Bussard, No. 05C-04-198 RCC, 2007 WL
901642, at *3-4 (Del. Super. Ct. 2007) (not reported) (noting that the majority's decision in
Marshall does not follow the reasoning of any prior cases that have examined whether a
duty exists when out of control vehicles enter buildings).
143.
See Washington v. City of Chicago, 720 N.E.2d 1030, 1033 (Ill. 1999). See
also Deborah J. La Fetra, A Moving Target: Property Owners' Duty to Prevent Criminal
Acts on the Premises, 28 WHITrER L. REv. 409, 432-33 (2006) (referring to Marshall as a
"tragically bizarre" case).
144.
Julie Miller, Landmark Case Increases Liability for Illinois Business Owners,
INSIDE COUNSEL, Sep. 2006 ("The Illinois Supreme Court's determination that a driver crashing through a brick wall is foreseeable strikes many observers as absurd. Many fear it will
expose business owners to liability for events that they could not have predicted.").
145.
See Lance v. Senior, 224 N.E.2d 231, 233 (111. 1967); see also Marshall, 856
N.E.2d at 1070 ("In a sense all such occurrences are foreseeable.").
146.
Hills v. Bridgeview Little League Ass'n, 745 N.E.2d 1166 (Ill. 2000); SullivanCoughlin v. Palos Country Club, Inc. 349 Ill.App.3d 553, 557 (I11.App. Ct. 2004); Bates v.
Richland Sales Corp., 803 N.E.2d 977 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
147.
Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1051 (Ill. 2006). See also
Raffen v. Int'l Contractors., Inc., 811 N.E.2d 229, 233 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (quoting St. Paul
Ins. Co. of Ill. v. Estate of Venute, 656 N.E.2d 113, 117 (I11.App. Ct. 1995)).
148.
As in third party intentional tort cases, an injury may be foreseeable based on
prior similar incidents. See, e.g., Sameer v. Butt, 796 N.E.2d 1063, 1071 (111. App. Ct. 2003)
(holding that "the stabbing was not reasonably foreseeable" because there were no similar
incidents within the preceding five years); Lucht v. Stage 2, Inc., 606 N.E.2d 750 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1992) (holding that an attack by an assailant was reasonably foreseeable based on the
knowledge of a dance club's employees).
149.
Marshall,856 N.E.2d at 1062.
150.
Id. at 1063 (stating that a similar case is distinguishable, at least in part, based
on the fact that it involved a review of a jury verdict and not a motion to dismiss); see also
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on its face for failing to state a claim.' 5 1 Such a motion is to be liberally
construed in favor of the plaintiff and dismissal should only be allowed
when plaintiff could not succeed under any set of facts.1 52 As such, dismissal under this section is considered to be drastic. 153 Accordingly, it may
be that the majority in Marshall is erring on the side of allowing the complaint to succeed by ruling that the injury was reasonably foreseeable.
However, it is not unprecedented for Illinois courts to 4find incidents to be
unforeseeable as a matter of law at the pleading stage.'More notably for negligence law, the Marshall court's foreseeability
analysis may be a foreshadowing of the removal of foreseeability from the
' 55
duty analysis. By pushing foreseeability into the "exemption analysis'
and holding that an unlikely event is reasonably foreseeable,156 the majority
has weakened the role of foreseeability in the duty analysis. It is possible
that the majority intended to limit the role of foreseeability in the duty
analysis given that foreseeability has come under fire in recent years and
some academics have even called for its removal from the duty analysis
altogether.157 Some find the use of foreseeability in the duty analysis especially troublesome when lack of foreseeability is used to create "no-duty"
rules. 158 The reasons behind the desire to limit foreseeability in negligence
Brief for Illinois Trial Lawyers Association in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee, at 2-5, Marshall
v. Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048 (Ill. 2006) (No. 100372) (arguing that defendants'
motion in effect required plaintiff to prove his case at the pleading stage).
151.
Marshall,856 N.E.2d at 1052-53.
152.
E.g., Ventura v. Picicci, 592 N.E.2d 368, 369 (I11.
App. Ct. 1992).
153.
E.g., Friedman, Alschuler & Sincere v. Arlington Structural Steel Co., 489
N.E.2d 308, 309 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
See MacDonald v. Hinton, 836 N.E.2d 893, 902 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (upholding
154.
the dismissal of a complaint for failure to warn because the harm inflicted was not foreseeable); Reynolds v. Nat'l R.R Passenger Corp., 576 N.E.2d 1041, 1043 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)
(finding that a complaint was properly dismissed because the action was "simply was not
within the realm of a reasonably foreseeable occurrence"); Petrauskas v. Wexenthaller Realty Mgmt. Inc., 542 N.E.2d 902, 907 (I11.
App. Ct. 1989) (upholding dismissal of a complaint because the allegations made were insufficient to impose a duty of care, by lacking
foreseeability).
155.
Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1060 (111. 2006).
156.
Id.
157.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 7 cmt.
j,98-99 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (calling for the abolishment of foreseeability in
the determination of duty); W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeabiliiy,58 VAND. L. REV.
739 (2005) (discussing problems with foreseeability as a determining factor in the duty
analysis).
158.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LtABILrrY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 7 cmt. j, 9899 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) ("Despite the frequent use of foreseeability in no-duty
determinations, this Restatement disapproves that practice... to facilitate more transparent
explanations of the reasons for a no-duty ruling and to protect the traditional function of the
jury as factfinder.").
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mirror the arguments for the categorical approach. 59 Using the lack of
reasonable foreseeability as a way of creating "no-duty" rules allows judges
to disguise their true reasoning behind their decisions. 16° Removing foreseeability from the duty analysis, it is argued,
will also give more power to
61
juries to determine the outcomes of cases.'

Regardless of the underlying reasoning, by pushing foreseeability into
an "exemption analysis" and applying it liberally, the majority has made it
extremely difficult for business defendants to overcome the presumption of
an affirmative duty to protect invitees in suits involving third-party negligence.
b.

Exemption Analysis Factor2: The Likelihood of the Injury

The second public policy factor in the exemption analysis used by the
majority in Marshall is the likelihood of the injury. 162 This factor is closely
related to the reasonable foreseeability of the injury 163 and sometimes they
are considered together. 64 As such, it is not surprising that the majority in
Marshallheld that the likelihood of the injuries in such instances is high. 65
Nonetheless, the manner in which the majority in Marshall applied the second public policy exemption factor also makes it difficult for business defendants to overcome the presumption of a duty to protect patrons in thirdarty negligence cases.
The majority in Marshall held that the likelihood of injuries occurring
under these circumstances was high based on the cases cited by the parties
in the case. 166 There are several problems with the majority's analysis, as
noted by the dissent. 167 The most troubling part of the majority's analysis is
that it does not truly contemplate how often injuries occur from similar
events. Certainly, there are instances when vehicles hit buildings and no

159.
See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
160.
Cardi, supra note 157, at 793-94.
161.
Id. at 794-95.
162.
Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1060-61 (I11.2006).
163.
See id. (stating that the likelihood of the injury is related to the reasonable foreseeability of the injury); Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd., of Ill., 730 N.E.2d 1119, 1134 (Ill.
2000) (stating that the same reasons that make an injury reasonably foreseeable are the same
ones that make the likelihood of injury high).
164.
See Lamkin v. Towner, 563 N.E.2d 449, 454 (I1l. 1990).
165.
Marshall, 856 N.E.2d at 1060-61.
166.
Id.
167.
Id. at 1074-75 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). The dissent notes that majority is
relying on self-selected cases in determining that the injury is likely. Id. Also, the dissent
notes that whether an injury occurs when cars are driven negligently on a business's property
is dependent on many factors. Id. at 1075.
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injuries occur. 168 However, it is unclear how often patrons are injured when
negligently driven cars crash into a business's building. It may be that only
drivers and passengers are typically injured. The court did not perform this
type of analysis even though similar evidence has been considered in other
cases. 169
The end result is that by analyzing this factor in this manner, the majority in Marshallhas made it extremely difficult for business defendants to
overcome the presumption of an affirmative duty to protect customers in
suits involving third-party negligence. This is because the likelihood of an
injury will be considered high as long as it is reasonably foreseeable and
there are other cases in which similar accidents have caused injuries.170 It
will be hard for future business defendants to argue that the likelihood of an
injury is slight due to the fact that the accident causing the injury is statistically low17because
the majority in Marshall did not even consider such an
1
analysis.

c. Exemption Analysis Factors 3 & 4: The Magnitude of the
Burden of GuardingAgainst the Injury & the Consequences of
Placingthat Burden on the Defendant
The third public policy factor in the exemption analysis used by the
majority in Marshall is the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the
injury.1 72 The magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury can be
173
generally defined as the defendant's cost of preventing the injury.
168.
See, e.g., Kat Zeman, Car Crash Limits Post Office Services, CHI. DAILY
HERALD (Final Edition), Dec. 8, 2006, News sec. at 5, available at
http://w3.lexis.com/lawschoolreg/researchlogin04.asp (reporting that no one was injured
when a car penetrated a post office); Andrew L. Wang, 2 Die When Car Rams Building
Daughter,27, Mom Called Best Friends, CHI. TRIB., Jul. 24, 2006, § 2, at 3 (stating that no
residents were injured when an out-of-control car hit an apartment building and potentially
causing major structural damage).
169.
See, e.g., Miller v. Highway Comm'r, 801 N.E.2d 599, 609 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003)
(holding that the risk of injury resulting from a car hitting a specific utility pole was slight
considering there had been no reported accidents involving that pole in more than twentytwo years); Carroll v. Faust, 725 N.E.2d 764, 770 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (stating that the likelihood of being burned by bathwater is slight because people generally test it first); Burlingame v. Chicago Park Dist., 689 N.E.2d 234, 236 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (claiming the likelihood of injury to some person was substantial considering the fact that there had been four
injuries in six years); Jacob v. Greve, 622 N.E.2d 81, 86 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that
the likelihood of injury was slight considering there had been no similar injuries reported in
thirteen years).
170. See Marshall, 856 N.E.2d at 1060-61.
171.
See id. at 1074-75 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
172.
Id. at 1060-61.
173.
See, e.g., Pageloff v. Gaumer, 849 N.E.2d 1086, 1089 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (holding the burden of preventing slip and falls on walnuts at a campground would be for the
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Whereas, the fourth public policy factor, the consequences of placing the
burden on the defendants, can be interpreted as the impact on society of
imposing the duty. 7 4 Although the majority in Marshall conflates its discussion of the third and fourth public policy factors, 175 considering these
factors together is not uncommon. 176 However, the majority's application
of these factors is out of line with precedent and will make it difficult for
business defendants to overcome the presumption of an affirmative duty to
protect created by the business invitor-invitee relationship.
In its application of the third and fourth public policy considerations,
the majority in Marshall states that the costs of guarding against the injury
are "speculative at best" and that the finding of a duty in this case does not
mean that there is a broad-based duty for businesses to install protective
poles or prevent cars from crashing into buildings. 177 To the contrary, however, finding that a duty exists in this case means that the defendants and
those similarly situated must protect against similar accidents in the future. 178 As noted by the dissent in Marshall, "[t]he duty imposed by the
majority necessarily encompasses the duty to provide protective barriers,"
because neither party has suggested any other means of preventing such an
campground owner to remove all walnut trees); Jackson v. TLC Assocs., 706 N.E.2d 460,
464 (111. 1998) (reasoning that the cost to remove a pipe that caused injury to the plaintiff
was an "insignificant burden"); Vosbein v. E.T. Simonds Constr. Co., 693 N.E.2d 500, 504
(Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (stating that injuries to a driver that collided with a movable barrier
could have been prevented by moving the barrier when finished with construction).
174.
See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1126 (111.
2004) ('"he negative consequence of judicially imposing a duty upon commercial enterprises to guard against the criminal misuse of their products by others will be an unprecedented expansion of the law of public nuisance."); Hutchings v. Bauer, 599 N.E.2d 934, 938
(I1l. 1992) (claiming that imposing a duty on this landowner would limit the ability of all
landowners from freely using their property) (Freeman, J., concurring); Bailey v. Edward
Hines Lumber Co., 719 N.E.2d 178, 183 (I11.
App. Ct. 1999) (holding that imposing a duty
on trade associations in favor of consumers would have a chilling effect on installation recommendations).
175.
Marshall, 856 N.E.2d at 1061. However, the dissent complained that the majority does not even address the fourth factor. Id. at 1077 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
176.
See, e.g., Ward v. K Mart Corp., 554 N.E.2d 223, 234 (Ill. 1990) (discussing
only the magnitude of the burden and not the consequences of placing that burden on the
defendant); Prostran v. City of Chicago, 811 N.E.2d 364, 372 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (discussing both the magnitude of the burden of imposing a duty and the consequences of imposing
the burden jointly); Pullia v. Builders Square, Inc., 638 N.E.2d 688, 694 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)
("The last two factors--the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury, and the
consequences of placing that burden upon defendant--are intertwined here.")
177.
Marshall,856 N.E.2d at 1061.
178.
See, e.g., Jackson v. TLC Assocs., 706 N.E.2d 460, 464 (I11.
1998) (reasoning
that the cost to remove a pipe that caused injury to the plaintiff was an "insignificant burden"); Pageloff v. Gaumer, 849 N.E.2d 1086, 1089 (I11.
App. Ct. 2006) (holding that if the
defendant had the burden of preventing slip and falls on walnuts at a campground, then the
campground owner would have to remove all walnut trees).
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accident. 79 It seems that some members of the business community
think
180
well.
as
behavior
their
change
to
them
requires
that this decision
Additionally, the dissent cited several cases in which courts have held
that requiring barriers around buildings is unreasonable.' 8' These cases are
in line with cases in Illinois in that they considered the costs and consequences of imposing a duty on a business defendant.1 82 For example, when
a minivan skidded off a roadway and hit a utility pole located about ten feet
from an intersection, the appellate court considered, among other things, the
magnitude of the burden the electric company would bear if a duty to protect the driver were placed on it and the consequences of placing that burden on the electric company. 83 In considering these factors, the court determined that the cost to move one pole may be small, but "the economic
costs of requiring [the electric company] to independently survey all of its
utility poles and determine whether any of them have been placed in dangerous locations based on particular road conditions, lighting conditions,
speed limits, signage, and other relevant conditions would be staggering." 184 Likewise, the costs to add protective poles at one restaurant may be
insignificant, but the economic cost to the defendants in Marshall would
include surveying every Burger King in Illinois and adding protective poles
to every restaurant that is determined to be in high-traffic areas with85 parts
of the building susceptible to penetration by out-of-control vehicles.'
179.
Marshall,856 N.E.2d at 1076 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
180.
Julie Miller, Landmark Case Increases Liabilityfor Illinois Business Owners,
INSIDE COUNSEL, Sep. 2006 (quoting Richard Morgan, managing partner of Bowman and
Brook, as saying, "[Tihere will be a lot of gnashing of teeth over whether buildings should
be retrofitted. Will [businesses] have to make their walls strong enough for just an out-ofcontrol Toyota or do they have to sustain a crash from a Hummer?").
181.
Marshall,856 N.E.2d at 1075 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Simmons
v. Aldi-Brenner Co., 515 N.E.2d 403, 408 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (imposing a duty "would
place a burden on every store, near a street or parking lot, of constructing barriers adequate
to prevent any car from being driven into the building"); Jefferson v. Qwik Korner Market,
Inc., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 171, 175 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) ("Imposing a duty on a convenience
store to protect a customer from every imaginable incident is an unreasonable burden: a
motorcycle can pass between metal posts and a large truck can break through a cement wall.
Only an impregnable barrier would suffice, in essence holding the store owner as the insurer
of its customers' safety. The law does not impose such a burden.").
182.
See, e.g., Jackson v. TLC Assocs., 706 N.E.2d 460, 464 (I11.
1998) (reasoning
that the cost to remove a pipe that caused injury to the plaintiff was an "insignificant burden"); Pageloff v. Gaumer, 849 N.E.2d 1086, 1089 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (holding the burden
of preventing slip and fails on walnuts at a campground would be for the campground owner
to remove all walnut trees); Vosbein v. E.T. Simonds Constr. Co., 693 N.E.2d 500, 504 (I11.
App. Ct. 1998) (stating that injuries to a driver that collided with a movable barrier could
have been prevented by moving the barrier when finished with construction).
183.
Miller v. Highway Comm'r, 801 N.E.2d 599, 609 (I11.
App. Ct. 2003).
184.
Id.
185.
See Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1062 (Ill. 2006).
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Assuming that imposing a duty on the defendants in Marshall leads to
some precautionary measures, 86 it is unclear what exactly the defendants
and those similarly situated must guard against. As noted by the dissent,
businesses may now have to guard against negligently driven trucks, SUVs
and motorcycles crashing into their buildings. 87 Each of these may necessitate a different type of barrier. For example, a motorcycle could go between protective poles and a negligently driven SUV or truck may not be
stopped by poles or even a concrete wall. 88 Thus, the burden to the defendants and those similarly situated may actually be much greater than the
cost to erect protective poles. It may include erecting
walls around every
189
building in Illinois that is near a road or a parking lot.
Essentially, the majority in Marshall analyzed the magnitude of the
burden of guarding against the injury and the consequences of placing the
burden on the defendants in a dismissive manner. 90 This is out of line with
Illinois case law,' 9' and also makes it difficult for business defendants to
overcome the presumption of an affirmative duty to protect patrons from
third-party negligent acts.
5. Application of the Majority'sAnalysis
Perhaps the best way to show the impact the majority's analysis in
Marshall will have on Illinois negligence law is by way of example. In
Gonzalez v. Kennedy Mobil, Jose Gonzalez was injured when an unattended
car struck him while he was standing behind his car pumping gas at a gas
station operated by Kennedy Mobil. 192 The car that struck Gonzalez had
been left unattended with the ignition on by another patron of the gas station. 193 In affirming the trial court's directed verdict in favor of Kennedy
Mobil, the appellate court held that "the general duty of reasonable care

186.
Id. see id. at 1076 (MeMorrow, J., dissenting).
187.
Id. at 1075 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
188.
Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (citing Jefferson v. Qwik Korner Market, Inc.,
34 Cal.Rptr.2d 171, 175 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)).
189.
Marshall, 856 N.E.2d at 1074, 1076-77 (McMorrow, J., dissenting) ("The only
way that a landowner can protect an invitee from an automobile penetrating its building is
either by relocating the business away from all roads and parking lots or, more plausibly, by
constructing an impenetrable barrier around the building.").
190.
See Marshall, 856 N.E.2d at 1061.
191.
Marshall, 856 N.E.2d at 1074, 1076-77 (McMorrow, J.,
dissenting) (citing City
of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1126 (I11.
2004), Gouge v. Central
Illinois Pub. Serv. Co., 582 N.E.2d 108, 114 (I11.
1991), and Ziemba v. Mierzwa, 566 N.E.2d
1365, 1369 (I11.
1991)).
192.
Gonzalez v. Kennedy Mobil Serv., Inc., 654 N.E.2d 624 (I11.
App. Ct. 1995).
193.
Id. at 625.
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which Mobil and Kennedy Mobil owed to [Gonzalez]
did not extend to the
' 94
particular risk which [Gonzalez] encountered."'
Based on the majority's reasoning in Marshall, if Gonzalez were decided today, Kennedy Mobil would have had an affirmative duty to protect
Gonzalez from the third-party negligent act of the other patron. A presumption of a duty to protect exists because Gonzalez was a business in1 95
vitee and the injury occurred by means of a third-party negligent act.
Also, a finding of "no duty" would be unacceptable because Marshall and
Gonzalez are seemingly within the same category of cases 196 - that is cases
in which invitees are injured by out-of-control vehicles. 9 7 Furthermore,
there would be no exception to the presumptive duty to protect based on the
four public policy considerations.198 The accident in Gonzalez would be
reasonably foreseeable "given the pervasiveness of automobiles, roadways,
and parking lots, that business invitees will, from time to time, be placed at
risk by automobile-related accidents."' 99 Similarly, the likelihood of injury
is high based on the fact that it is reasonably foreseeable 2 00 and that there
were other factually similar cases that could have been cited by the parties. 20 1 Furthermore, the burden of guarding against the injury and the consequences of placing the burden on the defendants can be dismissed as
speculative according to the majority in Marshall because imposing a duty
in this case does not mean that there is a broad based duty for businesses to
install protective poles or prevent cars from crashing into patrons pumping
gasoline. 2

194.
Id. at 630. See also Anderson v. Woodlawn Shell, Inc., 478 N.E.2d 10, 13 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1985) (holding no legal duty existed in a factually similar situation); Spurlock v.
Schwegmann Bros. Giant Supermarket, 475 So. 2d 20, 23-24 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (finding a
similar accident unforeseeable and thus outside the scope of the gas station's duty to the
invitee).
195.
See discussion supra Part IV.B. 1.
196.
Marshall, 856 N.E.2d at 1060. This is because "no-duty rules should be invoked only when all cases they cover fall substantially within the policy that frees the defendant of liability." Id.
197.
See Marshall, 856 N.E.2d at 1061 (stating "the duty of reasonable care that
businesses owe to their invitees applies to cases where invitees are injured by out-of-control
automobiles").
198.
Marshall,856 N.E.2d at 1060.
199.
Id. (quoting Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 665 P.2d 947, 952 (Cal. 1983)).
200.
Id. at 1060-61.
201.
Id. See also Anderson v. Woodlawn Shell, Inc., 478 N.E.2d 10, 13 (I11.
App. Ct.
1985) (holding no legal duty existed in a factually similar situation).
202.
Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1061 (Ill. 2006).
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Problems with the Application of the Analysis

For the reasons stated above, it appears that the Illinois Supreme Court
has created a duty analysis that, at a minimum, places a duty on businesses
near roads and parking lots to protect their patrons from out-of-control vehicles in all situations. 2 03 At worst, the majority in Marshall established
what amounts to a nearly per se duty for businesses to protect their invitees
from third-party negligent acts. 204 This is not a complete per se duty because the court has allowed an "exemption analysis" based on the traditional four-factor public policy test.20 5 However, based on the majority's
application
of the exemption analysis, it will lead to few "no-duty" rul26
ings. 0
The most significant problem with creating a nearly per se affirmative
duty to protect patrons is that it effectively makes business owners the insurers of their patrons' safety.2 °7 This flies in the face of black letter law2 °8
and should not be the law in Illinois. 2°9 Furthermore, imposing this duty
will have a significant impact on the operations of businesses and future
litigation.210
V.

PRACTICAL IMPACT

The majority's decision in Marshall will undoubtedly impact businesses and future litigation. Businesses, such as retailers and restaurants,
will incur costs and have greater exposure to liability. In regards to negligence law, more cases involving business premises liability will make it
beyond the pleading stages, which will increase litigation costs and likely
enhance settlement amounts.
As the defendants correctly argued, the ruling in this case has the potential to transform the landscape of Illinois towns and cities. 2 1 Businesses
203.
Marshall, 856 N.E.2d at 1074 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
204.
See discussion supra Part IV.B.
205.
Marshall, 856 N.E.2d at 1060.
206.
See discussion supra Part IV.B.4.
207.
Marshall,856 N.E.2d at 1074, 1077 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
208.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 cmt. f, at 225-26 (1965) ("Since the
possessor [of land] is not an insurer of the visitor's safety, he is ordinarily under no duty to
exercise any care until he knows or has reason to know that the acts of the third person are
occurring, or are about to occur.").
209.
See Marshall, 856 N.E.2d at 1072 (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (cautioning
against making businesses police the conduct of their patrons).
210.
See discussion infra Part V.
211.
Marshall, 856 N.E.2d at 1061. See also id. at 1077 (McMorrow, J., dissenting)
("The majority's holding is exceptionally broad and has the potential to alter substantially the
function and appearance of every city in the state.").
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near roads and parking lots, such as retailers and restaurants, will have to
relocate, retrofit existing buildings, or pay more for new construction in
order to protect their patrons from out-of-control drivers. 212 At a minimum,
buildings near parking lots and streets will have to add protective pillars to
protect patrons from out-of-control cars. 213 It may be that these pillars may
cost as little as a few hundred dollars.214 However, it is unclear if protective
pillars would be sufficient. 2 5 It would seem likely that a business would
also have a duty to protect from out-of-control SUV's, motorcycles or semitractor trailers.2t 6 Whatever precautionary steps businesses near highways
and parking lots choose to undertake, they should be prepared for their insurance premiums to rise with the increased risk of liability.2 17 Additionally, businesses that erect protective pillars may be subjecting themselves to
other forms of liability. Protective pillars may impede patrons egress from
the building in times of emergency 21 8 or lead to liability from patrons negligently running into them.2 19
Additionally, the arguments made by the plaintiff in Marshall could
seemingly be made against businesses in other industries as well. 220 Designers and builders of buildings, such as architects, construction companies, and engineers, may also be exposed to liability for failing to install or
advise on the installation of protective barriers. 22' This may be true even if

212.
Id. at 1074, 1076-77 (McMorrow, J., dissenting) ("The only way that a landowner can protect an invitee from an automobile penetrating its building is either by relocating the business away from all roads and parking lots or, more plausibly, by constructing an
impenetrable barrier around the building.").
213.
Id. at 1076 (Ill. 2006) (McMorrow, J., dissenting) ('The duty imposed by the
majority necessarily encompasses the duty to provide protective barriers.").
214.
Julie Miller, Landmark Case Increases Liability for Illinois Business Owners,
INSIDE COUNSEL, Sep. 2006 (quoting William T. Cacciatore, counsel for plaintiff, as saying
the protective pillars that defendants should have erected to prevent the decedent's injuries
would only cost a "few hundred dollars" to construct).
215.
Marshall,856 N.E.2d at 1075 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
216.
Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
217.
Julie Miller, Landmark Case Increases Liability for Illinois Business Owners,
INSIDE COUNSEL, Sep. 2006.
218.
Marshall, 856 N.E.2d at 1075 (McMorrow, J., dissenting); Heard v. Intervest
Corp., 856 So. 2d 359, 362 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a barrier to stop cars from
hitting a building could "impede the movement of residents in case of fire or other emergency where residents must quickly move away from the apartments").
219.
See Ward v. K Mart Corp., 554 N.E.2d 223, 224-225 (Il. 1990) (holding that a
business's duty of reasonable care included the risk that one of its customers would collide
with a concrete post, which was "presumably intended to protect the doorway from damage
or interference by backing or parked vehicles").
220.
Julie Miller, Landmark Case Increases Liability for Illinois Business Owners,
INSIDE COUNSEL, Sep. 2006.

221.

Id.
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the building is constructed in compliance with all codes and safety standards.22 2
In regards to future negligence cases, defendants will have a difficult
time successfully arguing for "no-duty" determinations in third-party negligence cases stemming from business invitor-invitee relationships. 223 This
means that defendants will not be able to end this type of litigation at the
pleadings stage or at summary judgment, 224 leading to greater litigation
expenses for defendants as they proceed through discovery. Additionally,
this may increase settlement amounts with one less hurdle for the plaintiff
to overcome.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court of Illinois in Marshallv. Burger King Corp. overturned a "no-duty" ruling of the trial court and determined that business
owners have a duty to protect patrons from out-of-control vehicles crashing
through their walls.225 The majority's opinion represents a significant shift
in Illinois negligence law.226 At a minimum, the court's holding places a
duty on businesses near roads and parking lots to protect their patrons from
out-of-control vehicles in all situations.227 At worst, the court has established what amounts to a nearly per se duty for businesses to protect their
invitees from third-party negligent acts.228 This is done through a new duty
analysis which begins with the presumption that an affirmative duty for
businesses to protect patrons from third-party negligent acts.229 This presumption is supported by the categorical approach to duty relied on by the
majority. 23° The majority relegated the traditional four policy considerations used in the duty analysis - (1) the reasonable foreseeability of the
injury; (2) the likelihood of the injury; (3) the magnitude of the burden of
guarding against the injury; and (4) the consequences of placing that burden
on the defendant 23' - to an "exemption analysis." 232 This "exemption

222.
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analysis" can be used to rebut the presumption of an affirmative duty for
businesses to protect patrons from third-party negligent acts, but this will be
difficult based on the majority's liberal application of reasonable foreseeability and likelihood of the injury and its deferential treatment of the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury and the consequences of
placing that burden on the defendant. 233 The practical impact of the Marshall decision will be increased costs and additional liabilities for businesses in Illinois as well as prolonged litigation for future business defendants whose invitees are injured by third-party negligent acts.234
JEFFREY H. POWELL*

232.
See id. at 1060-61, 1067-68 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). See also discussion
supra Parts IV.B.3, IV.B.4.
233.
See Marshall,856 N.E.2d at 1060-61. See also discussion supra Part IV.B.4.
234.
See discussion supra Part IV.
*
J.D. candidate, May 2008, Northern Illinois University College of Law;
B.S.B.A., summa cum laude, 2001, West Virginia University. I would like to dedicate this
article to my parents, Jane and Ray, who have taught me the importance of family and the
value of learning. I would also like to thank my wife, Jessica. Without her love and support,
this article would not have been possible. Additionally, I would like to thank Frank Perrecone for his thoughtful comments and suggestions.

